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THE ROLE AND UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER  
AND THEORIES OF POWER APPLICATION

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
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
USAWC RESEARCH PAPER

THE ROLE AND UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER AND  
THEORIES OF POWER APPLICATION

A MONOGRAPH

by

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This paper, written as a chapter of the forthcoming USAWC Strategy textbook, examines the role and usefulness of military power in a world made too dangerous by nuclear weaponry. The only sane policy for the contemporary use of US military power is deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict. While there is no alternative but to deter general war, lesser wars will break out from time to time, which the super-powers must work to keep limited. Deterrence of limited and sublimited wars is most credibly accomplished through possession of the capability to defeat them should deterrence fail. Nuclear power has made the world different in degree, but not in kind, in perception more than in practice, and not at all in principle. These new perceptions are examined in broad terms. How antagonists escalate a conflict in theory and how four sets of antagonists did it in practice are analyzed in detail. Some issues pertaining to deescalation and war termination are presented, followed by a final section on the use of US military power to achieve the Nation's mid and long range objectives.

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## SECTION I

### A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF POWER

#### INTRODUCTION

"War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means," said Clausewitz more than a century ago.<sup>1</sup> War, politics, and "other means" all have a common, immutable characteristic: their reliance upon the manipulation of the levers of power. What is power, and how does it differ from strength and force? Dictionaries do not shed much light because each of these words is ultimately given as a synonym for the others. For the purpose of this paper, and with some justification from the social as well as the natural sciences, the following simplifying distinctions will be made among them:

STRENGTH is the possession of useful resources;

POWER is available strength;

FORCE is projected power.

While strength is the basic ingredient, something must be added in order to convert it into something increasingly more useful.

Imagine for a moment a tiger in his cage. One of the strongest of animals, in his cage he has no power whatsoever. Open the door and his strength becomes power to run, to frighten, or to kill. He has that power whether he chooses to exercise it or not. Until he acts, his power is non-directional and potential. His sudden leap through the opened door to attack a hapless victim translates power into force. He has projected his available strength

(i.e., power) kinetically and directionally and with this force achieved a specific intent.

Every nation has strength in one form or another. Those whose strength is in a useful form available to their political leadership have power, without which they cannot long survive. The generally recognized forms of power characteristic of the nation state are: political, economic, military, geographic, and psycho-social. It is not the burden of this paper to analyze the exceedingly complex relationships among these various manifestations of power. No President of either party has failed in this century to respond to the challenge of external aggression against the United States. The US will continue to lead the world in economic power for many years to come. The centrality of the US geographical position, its friendly neighbors, and millions of square miles of ocean waters have spared the Continental United States any serious threat of invasion for over 150 years. They will continue to do so for all threats short of general war. But, while Presidents have not tired of leadership, a growing segment of the American people has become tired of global responsibility and fearful of the sacrifices that such responsibility brings. World War II marked the emergence of the United States as a truly world power. That war, however, may have been the highwater mark of its martial spirit. Increasingly ambiguous threats have made it difficult for the US political authorities to rally the psycho-social power so necessary to national power. While the remainder of this paper will be devoted to Military Power and its application, it must be

borne in mind that power is not force unless and until it is projected through a specific intent. If a nation lacks the will (psycho-social power) to project the other forms of power, however abundant they may be, that power is useless, or worse.

#### MILITARY POWER

Military power is that component of national power which can be translated into coercive or destructive force. It is comprised of a body of trained men under discipline, organized into suitable formations, equipped with efficient weapons and capable of exerting force on land, sea, or in the air as required. In simple terms it is the sum total of a nation's available military assets plus the moral strength to use them.

If military power can be brought to bear upon an enemy at a time and place of one's own choosing, such power is called offensive power. Thus, initiative is inherent in offensive power. The heavy bomber, ballistic missile submarine, and helicopter gunship are instruments of offensive power. Conversely, defensive power is power used to withstand attack by an enemy at his initiative. Defensive power is hence inherently reactive, although a successful defense nearly always retains an element of offensive power. A third form of military power, deterrent power, is a combination of offensive and defensive power with the former being the more important of the two. Deterrent power is the power to dissuade an enemy from committing hostile acts. Here the instrument of power is primarily the threat of force, rather than force itself.

### THE MEASUREMENT OF MILITARY POWER

National will and political nerve are hard to quantify, although gross estimates are useful. Perceptive estimates have undoubtedly been made of the US national will by the North Vietnamese and appear to have been a major factor in their selection of tactics, both in Vietnam and in Paris. Military power, however, is somewhat easier to assess. The importance of being able to do so is not so much to assign absolute values to capabilities but rather to be able to compare one's capabilities with any likely opponent. What really matters is relative power. As the world slowly moves from a simple bi-polar system to a penta-polar<sup>2</sup> one, comparison becomes far more complex. Nevertheless, one thing is clear in the missile age: The only power that really counts is power-in-being or reserve capacity in a high state of readiness. Military power-in-being at the super-power level is threefold: (1) strategic nuclear, (2) tactical nuclear, and (3) general purpose.

Strategic nuclear power is a function of the number and yield of warheads, the mix and operational effectiveness of their delivery systems vis-a-vis the enemy, and the excellence and flexibility of the command and control system that holds them all together. It is US national policy to retain "strategic-sufficiency," a deliberately vague term that means neither superiority nor parity, a term which like "beauty" may exist only in the eye of the beholder.<sup>3</sup> In an age when miscalculation between nuclear powers can lead to sudden and total destruction, a little uncertainty can be a good thing if

it causes antagonists to be more cautious. Tactical nuclear power on the other hand, is harder to evaluate vis-a-vis the enemy because tactical nuclear weapons are easier to hide. These weapons have an "equalizing" role against enemies possessing superior conventional power. The smaller yield nuclear weapons also raise the level of uncertainty by providing a nuclear option less than total war. This very uncertainty, however, makes it difficult to add them to the power equation in any quantifiable way. Finally, under power-in-being, we come to general purpose forces. Here gross numbers of men, weapons and vehicles tell only part of the story. These forces must also be measured in terms of their organization and doctrine, their morale and reliability, their readiness, the availability of strategic airlift and sealift and by all other kinds of support. In short, what kind of war can these forces fight and how quickly can they be brought to bear? President Kennedy was convinced that the general purpose forces bequeathed to him by President Eisenhower were inadequate to cope with "Wars of National Liberation," not so much because of numbers (although the Army was just under 857,000 in FY 61, lowest since 1950), but rather because of their doctrine and training. A certain amount of measurable strength was there, but power and its availability to the President for employment along the entire spectrum of modern war, was not only limited, but was difficult to measure. This is less so today, but what of tomorrow? What will the threat be then that reduces US options and hence its effective power?

No measurement of military power is complete without an assessment of the strength of the reserve components. The factors mentioned above for measuring the power potential of general purpose forces all apply to reserves, except that the time element looms much larger. How many reserve soldiers were there only to avoid the draft? Can they be mobilized and ready to reinforce Western Europe for example in the time allocated in our war plans? If not, enter a zero for them in the power column. More difficult to measure is motivation. Should they be called, how many will cause delays by pleading individual circumstances in court? Again, the mood of the public will make a decisive difference. If the threat to vital interests is not only dangerous but unambiguous, the American public can be expected to respond magnificently. But because the threat, especially since Korea, has not been clear to the general public, neither have the objectives. And "if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"<sup>4</sup>

#### THE USE OF MILITARY POWER TO INFLUENCE OTHERS

Military power has been used for a great many things, some moral, some immoral, since early man organized societies for his own protection. Power itself is amoral; its morality depends entirely upon its use. By military force insurrectionists have seized governments, aggressors have conquered whole nations, and fanatics and zealots have imposed their dogma on others. Brute force is the law of the jungle and needs no further elaboration here. Instead, this section is devoted to the more subtle use of

power, the power to influence the behavior of another. In this context, power may never be used at all, that is, it may never be converted to force. Power is most efficiently used when it is successfully threatened rather than actually projected, because the objectives are gained without expenditure of resources. The crucial factor in the successful use of power is whether it is enough. And how much is enough? It depends entirely on the power of the adversary. If opponent number one perceives a power differential at the point of decision great enough to convince him that he is better off doing what opponent number two wants, opponent number two's power is "enough" and opponent number one is "influenced."

What are the various configurations of power that can be used to influence others? The following categories are offered as a framework upon which other categories or subcategories can be conveniently fitted as desired. Power is used to influence others through: negotiation from strength; outright coercion (which may include psychological warfare); deterrence; and that failing, defense. One can argue that the ultimate influence is the physical destruction of an adversary or his homeland, or both. Within the scope and intent of this section, however, such brute force represents a failure of influence, and therefore will not be further considered.<sup>5</sup>

Smith Simpson says, "Power is not simply economic and military power; it is also diplomatic skill."<sup>6</sup> The heart and soul of diplomacy is negotiation; or in Thomas Schelling's words, "Diplomacy is bargaining . . . The bargaining can be polite or rude, entail threats as well as offers. . . . but whether polite or impolite,

constructive or aggressive . . . whether it occurs among friends or antagonists . . . there must be some common interest."<sup>7</sup> In other words, diplomacy is the exploitation of bargaining power, the quintessence of which is the power to hurt. Thus, military power, the power to hurt, is the backdrop and ultimate resource by which adversaries and sometimes reluctant friends negotiate with one another. When power is reasonably balanced, nations or groups of nations reach agreement through negotiation on the basis of "common interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual damage."<sup>8</sup> There is another dimension to negotiations, however, one that many Americans do not understand, that of negotiations as a weapon. In answer to the question, "Why should Russia negotiate, then, if it is not looking for agreements?", the prominent British analyst of Soviet policy, Malcolm Mackintosh, answered,

To understand why the Russians are talking to America it is important to understand the key to Soviet policy today. It is simply this, in my opinion: The Russians have reached what they regard as a state of strategic nuclear parity with the United States. And this basically stable strategic relationship with America provides them with an umbrella under which they can pursue a number of probes designed to expand Soviet political, military and economic influence and power all over the world and weaken the position of the United States. Negotiations is merely one of the weapons the Russians now are employing in these probes, together with other weapons such as economic and political penetration and straight military moves.<sup>9</sup>

The second use of military power is for coercion. If a nation has enough military power it need not negotiate; it merely coerces the adversary to do what he otherwise would not do. Coercion is

a positive thing that elicits a certain action from an adversary. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a classic example of coercion, a discussion of which is found later in this paper. Schelling uses the term "compellence" to describe such positive action.<sup>10</sup> Both terms imply superior military power in the hands of the coercer/compellor. This is not necessarily so. Nations adroit at psychological warfare have often succeeded in coercing their way despite an otherwise unfavorable military power differential at the point of decision. This technique prevents strength from becoming power by attacking the will to use it, making it effectively unavailable. The most spectacular successes of the modern era in this field must be credited to Adolph Hitler beginning especially with his announcement of the unilateral rearmament of Germany on 16 March 1935, and continuing through the complete occupation of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. Take for example, Hitler's conversation with Schuschnigg, Austria's unfortunate chancellor in 1938:

I need only to give an order, and overnight all the ridiculous scarecrows on the frontier will vanish . . . Then you will really experience something . . . After the troops will follow the SA and the Legion. No one will be able to hinder the vengeance, not even myself.<sup>11</sup>

Hitler's modern successors are found in some of the communist nations, especially the USSR, Mainland China, and North Vietnam. The latter a truly fourth rate power, has with consummate skill at psychological warfare succeeded in manipulating world and especially US public opinion to their own ends, thereby nullifying much of the vast power differential between themselves and the United States.

Deterrence is the opposite of "compellence" since the object of deterrence is to dissuade or prevent an adversary from taking some undesirable action. Because of its importance to the present world power balance, and because deterrence is the cornerstone of US military strategy, the next section will be devoted to it entirely.

The failure of deterrence forces a nation either to defend itself or to surrender. The latter course of action quite obviously signals the total failure of influence. On the other hand, defense in the simplest terms, influences an adversary by denying him his objectives by force of arms. These may be purely defensive measures such as shielding an ally from attack, or the defense may evoke the full spectrum of offensive countermeasures. An attack upon the aggressor's homeland may or may not be involved. Such was the case in World War I when the allies successfully defended France against Germany, yet stopped short of an assault upon the German homeland. Similarly, the United Nations were successful in defending South Korea against the Red Chinese intervention in 1950 without attacking Chinese territory. Such conflicts persist throughout the world today. But, defense need not be the result of a failure of deterrence. Indeed, a strong defense may be a very good deterrent. In this sense of the word defense, a country may defend itself or its allies without firing a shot. The difference between the defense which follows a failure to deter and the defense which is in itself a successful deterrent is that the former implies active combat while the latter does not.

## SECTION II

### EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

#### DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE

According to the Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage, deterrence is "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences . . . a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." In the real world

Violence can appear a perfectly rational instrument of policy to a state which stands to gain important strategic, economic or political advantages from the domination of helpless and disorganized neighbours . . . only the prospect of immediate and effective counter-violence can make it appear irrational.<sup>12</sup>

This is the heart and soul of deterrence: to make the use of force irrational in the minds of those who hope to gain from it.

Deterrent power is fundamentally "the power to hurt, not military strength in the traditional sense."<sup>13</sup> For example a terrorist with no military power whatever might deter a government from executing a fellow revolutionary by kidnapping some foreign diplomat. His deterrent power is clearly not based on his military strength, but rather on his power to hurt. Recent diplomatic kidnappings support Schelling's point that "hostages represent the power to hurt in its purest form."<sup>14</sup> On a far grander scale, this aspect of deterrence is evidenced in a second strike nuclear strategy in which entire cities are "held" hostage.

### THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DETERRENCE

What are the essential elements of an "effective deterrence?"

First, there must be a rational opponent. If the enemy's leaders are lunatics, fools, or unbalanced in some totally unpredictable way, deterrence is impossible. The enemy must have some sort of "risk calculus" by which he places a valuation on his assets and national objectives, assesses the cost he is willing to pay to attain his objectives, and computes the probabilities of success of the alternatives open to him.<sup>15</sup>

Second, there must be a capability to inflict unacceptable pain. In terms of military deterrence, this means weapons of suitable destructive power and the means to deliver them effectively. Among some "desirable" characteristics are:

1. Frightening
2. Inexorable
3. Cheap
4. Non-accident prone
5. Controllable<sup>16</sup>

Characteristic # 1 speaks for itself. "Inexorable" (# 2), in this context means mechanically infallible and not susceptible to countermeasures. A weapon should be "cheap" (# 3) in a relative sense. If it costs more than the worth of the target, it isn't very cost effective. Finally, the deterring power must be master of his deterrent (# 4 and 5). If his weapons are neither "non-accident prone" nor fully "controllable," the deterred power cannot be sure of his safety even if he fully complies with the deterring power's

demands. In such a situation he may have nothing to lose by making a preemptive strike.

Finally, for a deterrent to be effective it must be credible.

#### MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY

Since both the Soviets and the Americans are generally rational people and since both countries have suitable weapons and delivery systems, the maintenance of credibility has been and will continue to be the most variable element of mutual deterrence. Credibility is itself a function of several variables. Among them are the predictability of the opponents, the structure of the deterrent forces, the value of the objects the deterrent is designed to protect, and the will of the deterrer to employ the deterrent.

Because an opponent is rational, it does not mean he is predictable. Predictability can be useful if it lessens the chance of miscalculation. Conversely, too much predictability may tempt one opponent to exploit the anticipated "automatic" response of the other, thereby creating a dangerous imbalance. In certain cases, a measured amount of uncertainty can be useful if it increases the caution of the opponents, i.e. makes them more reluctant to probe one another. Ever since the McNamara era, the US has made an effort to be reasonably predictable by periodically publishing the major elements of its strategic nuclear doctrine to ensure that the US does not look too dangerous to its allies, neutrals, or the Soviets.<sup>17</sup> Prudence demands that adversaries not be made to feel any more insecure than necessary. It is for this reason that the US has

deliberately avoided the development of a destabilizing first-strike capability. This is entirely consistent with American cultural resistance to "hitting first." The Soviets, on the other hand, may not have similar scruples. Their continued development and deployment of large counterforce-type weapons leaves their intentions unclear.

This leads into the question of force structure "quality." Credibility depends a great deal upon the mix and survivability of weapons and their delivery systems and the sophistication of its command and control. For example, if the US had the capability of detecting in time which silos are being held in counter-value reserve during a Soviet preemptive strike, SAC could redirect the launch of the entire Minuteman force against those reserve silos, with a significantly higher probability of destroying them while his missiles are impacting on our empty silos. With a superior bomber and SLBM force, the US might then be in a position to force termination of hostilities on very favorable terms by threatening far greater destruction of the Soviets' industrial and population centers. Such a prospect would presumably be very effective in deterring a Soviet first strike under these circumstances.

The value of the objects being protected also affects credibility. The doctrine of massive retaliation failed because the Soviets (and the French) began to doubt that the US would destroy the Soviet Union (and invite destruction upon itself) to defend Europe against some "small" aggression by the Soviet Union. Moreover during the post-War years when the US had a nuclear monopoly,

it did not use these weapons to deter the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Greece, the fall of China, or the aggression in Korea. No one can blame the Soviets if they now wonder about US willingness to employ such weapons against anything short of a direct attack on the US proper. The importance of the target, as demonstrated by the measures the US has taken diplomatically and militarily to defend it, is an important component of US credibility. One further word about the will of the deterrent to employ the deterrent.

The US Government does not threaten civil rights marchers or campus rioters in this country with tanks because the threat is not credible. No political authority would dare order their use. The Russians, however, do not shrink from using tanks against such persons because their credibility is high. No one doubts Soviet willingness to crush a few recalcitrants. On the other hand US troops in Berlin, completely surrounded by a hostile East Germany are equally credible. They have no place to go; they have to fight if attacked. They are there as a credible demonstration of US willingness to fight. Clausewitz wrote that the purpose of war is not the physical destruction of the enemy but of the enemy's will to resist. The Soviets understand this very well and have made the erosion of the free world's (and especially the US's) will to resist a primary objective of their foreign policy. Their efforts in Berlin in 1949 and 1961, Cuba in 1962, and Vietnam in 1965 to the present are obvious examples. They failed in Berlin and Cuba. They have come very close to succeeding in Southeast Asia. The

erosion of confidence in US defense policies, as evidenced by pressures against ROTC, defense spending, the draft, and on-campus military research, signals an apparent diminishment of US national will to resist, which if true can have serious consequences to the US deterrent posture. While there may be some dissent in the Soviet police state, one rarely, if ever, hears of complaints of the heavy armaments burden thrust upon the Soviet people.

Russians have long memories. They have not forgotten Genghis Khan, Napoleon or Hitler. As a result, the security of "Mother Russia" is a national obsession. The Soviets see the success of their foreign policy which has kept them from direct involvement from wars beyond their borders; succeeded in weakening NATO and strengthening Warsaw pact military postures; gained them important influence on the North African littoral; established a Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean and moved them from strategic inferiority to a position of parity with the US in strategic nuclear power. Their momentum shows no sign of slackening. Soviet R & D budgets for example continue to out-strip US R & D expenditures both in percent of GNP and in absolute dollars.

The acceptance of risk is inherent in the will to resist. As long as the United States, and in particular its leadership, continues to be willing to stand up to the challenge of Soviet power with all of its attendant risks and do so confidently, and above all convincingly, US deterrence will continue to be credible and hence effective. But the moment any risk becomes "unacceptable,"

thereby signaling a weakened will to resist, the US deterrent will soon lose its credibility and invite disaster.

#### SWORD AND SHIELD

Next consider for a moment the difference between that deterrent capacity which threatens nuclear punishment and that which denies territorial gain to an enemy. The examples of deterrence used thus far have been of the punishment or "sword" variety (Herman Kahn's "Type I" and "Type II" deterrents. Type I is deterrence against a direct strategic attack on the deterrer's homeland. Type II is strategic deterrence against provocative acts short of a strike against the deterrer's homeland.) Deterrence as denial or "shield," is typically provided by conventional ground, sea and air forces which have sufficient power to repel or eject an enemy from friendly territory and therefore tend to deter him (Kahn's Type III deterrent).<sup>18</sup> In the absence of adequate conventional power, tactical nuclear weapons might be a part of the deterrent. The US has attempted to establish credibility for just such a conventional deterrent by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in NATO Europe. The Soviets on the other hand are just as eager to convince the West that any use of nuclear weapons would quickly trigger an escalation to uncontrolled nuclear war. Here is a classic example of the super-powers maneuvering to establish credibility for the deterrent doctrine that best suits their purpose, in this case the negation or exploitation, respectively, of Soviet conventional superiority.

The threat of punishment (the "sword"), either massive or limited, forces the aggressor to count the cost in advance since it operates primarily against his value inventory. Denial, on the other hand, may cost the aggressor little in terms of his own high value assets; rather it operates primarily against the probability of his seizing and holding someone else's assets (i.e., territory). These particular distinctions are not absolute. For example, punishment could be used to force withdrawal from territorial gains, while the use of tactical nuclear weapons, instead of denying territory, might cause escalation to general war. Shield and sword also differ in their credibility or probability of application.

The sword of punishment is a highly credible deterrent against a direct attack on the deterrer's homeland, but it lacks credibility for lesser challenges, for example a conventional attack against an ally as described above in the NATO case. As Professor Snyder says,

While the making of a threat of nuclear punishment may be desirable and rational, its fulfillment is likely to seem irrational after the aggressor has committed his forces, since punishment alone may not be able to hold the territorial objective and will stimulate the aggressor to make counter-reprisals. The deterrer therefore has a strong incentive to renege on his threat. Realizing this in advance, the aggressor may not think the threat a very credible one. A threat of denial action will seem more credible on two counts: it is less costly to the deterrer and it may be effective in frustrating the aggressor's aims, or at least reducing his gains. A denial response is more likely than reprisal action to promise a rational means of defense in case deterrence fails; this consideration supports its credibility as a deterrent.<sup>19</sup>

In summary, the sword (punishment) may be perceived by the aggressor in terms of the deterrer's intentions, whereas the shield (denial) will more likely be perceived in terms of the deterrer's capabilities. Only shield forces in being have any deterrent meaning. US forces are on the ground in Europe at least in part because they are a measurable indication of US capability, not just intent, to defend western Europe should deterrence fail.

#### DETERRENCE AND STABILITY

Finally, a stable world demands that deterrence be balanced. In the nuclear age, no nation has the right to absolute security, because all others are thereby forced into absolute insecurity. Any new effort by either super-power to achieve a clear strategic superiority over the other is not only expensive, it is destabilizing and dangerous. It is also futile, because the arms race has brought real security to no one. Any attempt by the Soviets to deploy a highly credible first strike force sufficient to destroy the US Minuteman force, would compel the US to take immediate counteraction. These measures might include greater numbers and dispersion of its missile force, greater hardening of sites, better ABM protection, or increased ICBM mobility. Or, should the Soviets deploy an ABM system comprehensive enough to protect the major portion of its high value inventory, US second strike forces would lose much of their deterrent value. The US would then be forced to expand its own ABM defenses or to deploy even more sophisticated offensive systems to defeat the Soviet ABM defenses. In other

words, any move which seeks either to destroy an opponent's strategic offensive power or to protect his own high value inventory extensively is destabilizing. Therefore, the SALT negotiators are presumably seeking as a first and most important step to limit both further deployment of large yield ICBM's and extended ABM systems around cities and industrial centers.

### SECTION III

#### FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT NUCLEAR POWER HAS BROUGHT TO THE WORLD

Klaus Knorr in his excellent little book, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (1966)<sup>20</sup> says, "It is obvious that, since World War II, there has been a major, if not a dramatic, change in the conception of international war and in the utility of national military power. The usability and utility of military force have undergone a vast transformation, but that the utility of national military power has positively declined we are unable to prove compellingly." It is the premise of this chapter that the world is a different place because of nuclear power; but it is different in degree and not in kind, in perception more than in practice and not at all in principle.

This new age was ushered in when the B-29, Enola Gay, dropped a 20 kiloton fission bomb on the city of Hiroshima in August of 1945. Clausewitz, invoked earlier, might have observed that the real mission of the Enola Gay was not to kill the people of Hiroshima but to terrify the people of Tokyo. The power to hurt in a totally new and frightfully efficient form suddenly overwhelmed the Japanese will to resist and the war was over.<sup>21</sup>

If ever there was an argument that nuclear power was going to reshape the world, its vindication should have been expected in the years immediately following the end of the World War II. Yet, as everyone knows, the US did not use its nuclear monopoly to police the world. This is truly remarkable when it is remembered that

these years were an era of the most blatant Soviet expansionism. One wonders how the world would look today if the US, backed by its nuclear power and the credible will to use it, had demanded a different order in Eastern Europe or on the Chinese mainland. An examination of all the major east-west confrontations since 1945 fails to show that the possession of nuclear weapons by either side made any important difference in the outcome. What then is different about the world in the nuclear age? First, and most important, there is a heightened feeling that Armageddon is now possible and on very short notice. This perception has been successful in keeping the US and the Soviets from any real confrontation of combat forces for over 25 years. It also has been a sharp limiting factor on the activities of their "clients," because of the danger that unforeseen escalation may draw the super-powers into conflicts against their will. Second, nuclear weapons have a "mystique" all their own. In the hands of lesser powers, especially, they have often given them a prestige and a voice in world affairs out of all proportion to their total power. Certainly DeGaulle used his tiny nuclear force to command large respect. Third, military victory is no longer the "price of admission" to a country's high value inventory. There is no longer much strategic difference between homeland and battlefield. Whole nations can be destroyed with their armies still intact.

How much have these new perceptions really changed things? What has been their impact on some selected "old" relationships or situations:

1. Military strategy and the use of military power.
2. Super-powers, lesser power, and their alliances.
3. Role and composition of the strategic reserve.
4. Mobilization of resources.
5. Employment of reserve component forces in crises.

#### MILITARY STRATEGY AND USE OF MILITARY POWER

Someone has said that the first duty of a nation is to survive.

It should be added: "under conditions acceptable to that nation."

Klaus Knorr says that "what all states desire is a 'compatible' world and hence they want to limit, if not overcome, the power of hostile states and groupings by interposing their countervailing power if they can do so . . . US power is directed to serve essentially defensive purposes, including the preservation of a world order in which the United States, and other societies of the same political and economic character, are able to prosper."<sup>22</sup> These words could have been written 100 years ago.

As a "status quo" power, the unchanging strategic objectives of the US have been essentially negative in character: the prevention of nuclear war and the "containment" of hostile states. The US has not sought to extend its own territorial hegemony. What has changed is the US perception of how its military power should be structured and projected to deter credibly Soviet expansion by force across the entire spectrum of violence.

The United States, under the Nixon Doctrine, has pulled back from the role of world policeman, chartered more or less as the

Truman Doctrine and energetically expanded during the Eisenhower administration. It became increasingly obvious, however, that the structure of US military power (designed for hardly more than "massive retaliation") would not support that role. There was great strength but little power to counter "wars of national liberation" because that strength was not available in the form needed to defeat such conflicts. As discussed under shield deterrence, only forces strong enough to defeat this type of aggression are strong enough to deter it credibly.

One of the most important lessons learned over the years is that military power in the nuclear age must be balanced, but above all dynamic, that is, completely responsive to new strategies designed to deter or defeat a constantly changing, often ambiguous threat. The key lies not so much with weapons as with dynamic and dedicated men of flexible mind and iron nerve who understand all the instruments of power and who are totally dedicated to their effective employment in the national interest.

#### SUPER-POWERS, LESSER POWERS, AND THEIR ALLIANCES

The increasing trend after World War II was a division of the World into three principal groupings: The Communist Bloc, a monolithic, tightly controlled and expansionist; the Western democracies, a loose defensive confederation of reluctant allies under the leadership of a benevolent giant; and the neutralist "camp," a third, even looser, group which was generally out of the mainstream and, except for a great deal of noise, contributed

essentially nothing to what was essentially a bipolar world. During these years, the nuclear might of the super-powers was the cement that both bound the first two groups together and kept them separated from one another. The communist bloc had the additional cement of ideology to help bind it together. For the past 10 years, however, the solidarity of the first two "blocs" has suffered all but irreparable damage, brought about by:

1. The economic ascendancy of Western Europe and Japan.
2. The expansion of the nuclear club to five members.
3. The Sino-Soviet split.
4. The fear of the revival of German power and militarism.
5. The overextension of US commitments abroad.
6. The increasing pressures by the masses for consumer goods and comforts, especially in Eastern Europe.

With the super-powers preoccupied with one another, or jointly worried about China, the lesser powers in the West, and to a certain extent in the East, have increasingly drifted apart. Since nuclear war is "unthinkable" to so many, the rest of the world tends to ignore it by leaving it to the super-powers. The latter seem content with that role and make it one of the rare matters of mutual, continuing concern to see that nuclear weapons proliferate no further. Knorr in an illuminating discussion of the psychology of the use of power by super-powers says:

If there are severe restraints on the usability of military force between the super-powers in one respect, this usability is for them greater in their relations with lesser nuclear powers.

However, even though in any such encounter the super-power need not fear enormous damage to itself, the usefulness of bringing its military superiority into play is restricted considerably. It is, of course, reduced by the diminished legitimacy of war and hence by the costs which illegitimate applications of force may generate. It is also restricted by the special stigma attached to the employment of nuclear bombs . . . It is limited by the support which the super-power may lend to the lesser nuclear state facing another nuclear super-power. And it is, finally, restricted by whatever retaliation the smaller power may threaten to wreak on the greater nuclear power.<sup>23</sup>

With regard to the impact of defensive systems on these relationships, Knorr concludes that:

. . . if each super-power proceeds to deploy ABM defenses that, though perhaps inadequate to deal with a saturation attack by the other super-power, may be capable to countering the small-scale or ragged attack a lesser nuclear power is able to mount. That is to say, its capacity to inflict severe punishment on great nuclear powers may be very limited, dubious, or flatly lacking. With the intensity of mutual threats being very, and perhaps grossly, unequal, it is also likely that the credibility of the threats will be unequal, and so then is deterrent power. It would surely be rash to conclude that military superiority is a meaningless concept when great nuclear powers are pitted against the small. The latter's fear of retaliation should be paramount . . . Even if, in such a confrontation of unequals, the great nuclear power is self-deterring for one reason or another from using its nuclear might, or from making explicit nuclear threats, the implicit threat is there and its government can press much harder for a settlement on its terms; and if limited war occurred, it would probably enjoy escalation dominance. Thus, decidedly lesser nuclear powers cannot afford to pursue toward a superior nuclear power a high-risk policy involving a high level of international violence. Nuclear powers equipped, in Leo Szilard's phrase, only with "the sting of the bee" -- the bee that dies after he has stung --

are unlikely to inspire as much terror as they themselves experience; and this lack of real mutuality may give the military capabilities of the superior powers utility of a wider range.<sup>24</sup>

It is likely that China sees herself in this role vis-a-vis both super-powers, since the Sino-Soviet split. This sheds some light, perhaps, on China's recent willingness to ease tensions with the United States, as the less hostile of the super-powers. Before moving on to relations with non-nuclear powers, Knorr comments on alliances between super-powers and lesser nuclear powers, after reflecting on the usual advantages of alliances to both parties:

The realization of these advantages would be conditioned, however--perhaps heavily so--by cross-rank alliances . . . /and/ all nuclear powers--and notably the great . . . would face an increased risk, inherent in international conflict entanglements, of being caught in nuclear conflict as a result of policies pursued by allies and other states. The flat disutility of becoming involved in nuclear war by inadvertance would hover ominously over all nuclear power . . .<sup>25</sup>

It is in the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear powers that one perceives the greatest paradox of all--the more (nuclear) power one has the less useful it is. As the years pass, the likelihood of using these weapons for anything short of retaliation against another nuclear power has become increasingly slim. The "nuclear threshold" is as real today as the Berlin Wall (See page 43 for a detailed discussion of this threshold). Nevertheless, as improbable as the use of nuclear weapons may be under these

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circumstances, there will always be some uncertainty on the part of the adventuresome non-nuclear power. Knorr continues,

To the extent that the stigma causes restraint, it deprives nuclear armament of usability in combat. Yet its usefulness is not nil, and the possession of tactical nuclear weapons does confer a degree of utility on nuclear power . . . the costs of defying the stigma are not a fixed constant, but a variable liability. They would presumably be less . . . if the non-nuclear power behaved with evident and shocking aggressiveness . . . The restraint will tend to be less inhibiting when a severe crisis is at hand, and the stakes are vital. On the other hand, the non-nuclear power can never be sure that, if it presses too hard, the option will not be exercised. This uncertainty is bound to affect its willingness to enter a serious military contest with a nuclear power.<sup>26</sup>

#### THE ROLE AND COMPOSITION OF THE STRATEGIC RESERVE

"We will act to defend our interests whenever and wherever they are threatened any place in the world," said President Nixon on 20 January 1972.<sup>27</sup> The key word is "defend" and the key phrase is "any place in the world." Defense is achieved with general purpose forces. They are either deployed forward, as in Central Europe, or they are held in strategic reserve. There are those who say that the US Army will not be called upon to fight in the next decade, because nuclear power will deter the big wars and the US public will not permit "any more Vietnams." This rationale may look good to social scientists and budget cutters, but the hard reality is that the Soviets are moving ahead in the build-up of highly mobile, general purpose forces of their own, forces that can be projected far beyond their borders. If the US is to maintain a

credible deterrent across the entire spectrum of conflict, the strategic reserve must be capable of meeting this new threat with well-balanced, sophisticated ground forces, suitably supported with a fully responsive sea and air lift and with strong tactical air forces. Although the probability of having to commit lighter forces for "brush fire" wars has decreased measurably under the Nixon Doctrine, the requirement to reinforce NATO Europe has not diminished. If forward deployments there are drawn down appreciably, the burden upon the strategic reserve will be increased accordingly. The sealift situation is not encouraging. In summary, the missions of the strategic reserve over the midrange period will as a minimum include:

1. Reinforcement of forward deployed forces world-wide.
2. Readiness to defeat any Soviet conventional threat outside areas contiguous with the USSR.
3. To a lesser extent, providing combat assistance to indigenous forces resisting insurgent threats, when our vital interests are at stake.

The first two missions require dual capable forces. The third implies readiness to deploy anything from experienced advisers up to highly mobile brigade size task forces.

#### MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

Despite its military weakness before the two world wars, the United States mobilized vast industrial and manpower resources in time to defeat those who threatened to destroy the world balance

of power. In military jargon, "space was traded for time." (Korea does not illustrate the point as well because this was the first modern war involving the US in which the objectives, and hence the mobilization, were limited.)

Until the nuclear age, the mobilization potential of nations was an important and quantifiable component of a nation's power. In the previous discussion concerning the measurement of military power it was stated that "in the missile age the only power that counts is power-in-being or reserves that are in a high state of readiness." This does not mean that mobilization potential is no longer important. What it does mean is that it is no longer of first importance. Without fully credible forces in being, able to deter a strategic nuclear attack, the US invites a war that could be concluded adversely to its interests in a matter of hours, whether there was a "vast" mobilization potential or not. What is truly important about such potential is that if by miscalculation the Soviets do press a strategic attack which the US survives and to which it retaliates, the preattack mobilization potential of the US becomes a measure of how soon after such an attack the nation can be rebuilt. Thus far, however, most analysts do not consider any such miscalculation to be very credible. Assuming the continued commitment to and success of "strategic sufficiency," is not mobilization potential still important across the remainder of the spectrum of violence? The answer is still a qualified "less important than before," because deterrence of most threats short of general war still requires forces in being. But even if such deterrence fails,

Korea and Vietnam have shown that this country can produce both "guns and butter," without extensive industrial mobilization, in support of low and medium intensity conflict. This leads to the final "situation" in this section on new perceptions.

#### EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES IN CRISES

Although the US was well able to produce both "guns and butter" for Korea and Vietnam, it is generally acknowledged, in military circles at least, that the reserves should have been called up for Vietnam, as they were for Korea. The use of reserves in crisis situations has two important advantages:

1. They enhance deterrence by signalling grave concern, without necessarily heating up the actual crisis arena. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, President Kennedy announced several measures to demonstrate US determination to resist Soviet/GDR encroachment on Allied access to the city. Among these measures was the request to Congress for authority to call up the ready reserves. This call up was considered to be one of the key factors in Khrushchev's subsequent backdown.
2. Deterrence failing, the reserves, mobilized and ready, would substantially reinforce the regular establishment. They would thus provide a viable option between submission or nuclear war when vital interests were at stake. Finally, another obvious advantage (particularly if the threat is ambiguous and not easily explainable to the public) is a greatly reduced initial reliance on the draft with all of its built-in delays and political liabilities.

## SECTION IV

### LEVELS OF WARFARE AND ESCALATION TECHNIQUES

Herman Kahn succinctly defines escalation as "an increase in the level of conflict in international crisis situations."<sup>28</sup> As a prelude to any discussion of escalation theory, it is useful to review that portion of the escalation spectrum involving the use of force, i.e., the application or projection of military power.

#### LEVELS OF WARFARE

As will be seen in the discussion of Kahn's escalation ladder, beginning on page 40, one can devise a very long list of increasingly dangerous levels of warfare. A simpler three-level model, however, into which nearly all of these fine gradations can be fitted is as follows:

1. General War--Large scale war between the Super-powers.  
The most common scenario predicts a massive thermonuclear exchange at an early stage. The key element at stake is national survival.
2. Limited War--War, primarily conventional, between one super-power and a lesser power or powers, or between lesser powers.  
Further distinctions can be postulated with varied levels of the use of nuclear weapons, but as long as only one super-power is directly concerned, the war can be considered limited. A further type of limited war which directly involves both super-powers can be postulated in which the conflict is limited in scope and waged away from either homeland. Such a prospect is highly unlikely, however, since the danger of immediate and uncontrolled escalation

is so great. Herein lies the real strength of the US conventional deterrent in Central Europe.

3. Sublimited War--All lesser levels of conflict, short of a contest between the regular forces of any combination of powers. If the super powers are involved, one or both are normally fighting through proxies, except as previously noted. The so-called "War of National Liberation" is the most obvious contemporary example.

These categories are in effect an interplay between means and ends. The national survival of super-powers would be at stake in any general war in the modern era. The means, therefore, are limited only by whatever constraints either or both combatants see which could enhance their survival. Because of the dangers of collateral damage to the rest of the world and the profound and unpredictable changes which could be expected in the world balance of power, the entire world tends to be united on this one issue: prevention of general war. The arrival in the world arena of other military super-powers in the next 20-50 years (such as China or a united Europe or, less likely, Japan) will vastly complicate not only the global power relationships but also the definitions which theorists of that era will be called upon to devise.

"Lesser" wars are "thinkable" only because war is the nature of man and therefore inevitable. Because human nature cannot be changed, it is the duty of every responsible statesman to see that suitable limitations are placed upon these lesser levels of conflict to:

1. Prevent them above all from escalating to general war, and if possible, from any use of nuclear weapons.
2. Bring them to a "satisfactory" conclusion in as short a time as possible. ("Satisfactory" is defined as whatever provides the highest probability for non-recurrence of violence or best promotes long term stability.)
3. Minimize the suffering of any innocent parties concerned.

#### ESCALATION THEORY

The whole theory of escalation is based upon the fact that the chief actors do not want higher levels of violence or else they would proceed to them immediately. Why, then, do adversaries escalate conflict? They do so to seek an alternative between surrender and unlimited violence. Escalation differs from negotiation in that escalation seeks through coercion to force recognition of the primacy of one interest over another while negotiation seeks to identify a commonality of interest. Kahn suggests at least three ways an adversary can escalate his efforts. These are, from figure 1:

1. Increasing intensity (or magnitude).
2. Widening the area.
3. Compounding the escalation.<sup>29</sup>

The "agreed battle" above refers to the normal situation where both antagonists accept certain limitations, although not necessarily agreed to formally. During the Korean War for example, US aircraft did not attack Chinese airfields north of the Yalu and the Chinese did not attack installations south of the Main Line of Resistance.




FIGURE 1  
THREE WAYS TO ESCALATE A LIMITED CONFLICT

The most obvious way to escalate a conflict is to increase the magnitude or intensity of force being applied; i.e., of doing more of what one is already doing. The use of nuclear weapons would be a large increase in intensity. Some of the implications of this particular threshold will be discussed in detail later. A second way to escalate is by widening the area of conflict. This could (some say "should") have been done in Korea by taking out those Chinese airfields north of the Yalu which were within range.

of the battle area. Had the bombing proceeded further, say to Peking, this would have been a "compound" escalation, Kahn's third form of escalation, i.e., the attack of a "central sanctuary." These were viable options in Korea but they were not elected.<sup>30</sup>

In general, there are two basic classes of strategies by which limited and sublimited wars can be fought:

1. Those which can be applied within the limits of the "agreed battle" to gain advantages sufficient to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion.
2. Those which employ the threat of escalation or "eruption"<sup>31</sup> from the agreed battle. This class of strategy does not preclude the selection by the "escalator" of some new limit of violence, which he may or may not announce. Use of this class of strategy is commonly called "brinkmanship." When both sides try their hand at it, the situation is similar to the game of "Chicken," sometimes played by adolescent thrillseekers.

#### THE STRIKE AND "CHICKEN" METAPHORS

Both Schelling<sup>32</sup> and Kahn<sup>33</sup> treat these two metaphors at length. Although not perfect (metaphors and analogies seldom are), they illustrate some interesting aspects of the escalation phenomenon--the labor strike paralleling some characteristics of the lower rungs of the escalation ladder and the game of "chicken" paralleling the upper rungs. These metaphors are summarized by Kahn as follows:

In a strike situation, labor and management threaten to inflict harm on each other, do so, and under pressure of the continuation of this harm, they seek agreement. It is usually assumed that events will not escalate to the limit (i.e., erupt): we do not expect workers to starve to death or businesses to go bankrupt. In a strike, each side is expected to hurt or threaten to hurt, but not to "kill" or even permanently injure the other side. Under pressure of continuing threats of harm, it is assumed that some compromise will be arrived at before permanent or excessive damage is incurred. Occasionally, these expectations are not fulfilled; a business does go bankrupt, or the workers do look for jobs elsewhere. But this is rare. Usually, the strike is settled long before such limits are approached.

In this context, the question immediately comes up, "Why go through this expensive, dangerous, and uncomfortable route to settle disputes? Why have a strike at all? Why not settle the dispute?" The answer is obvious. In the absence of enforceable or acceptable adjudication, the side most afraid of a strike will tend to get the worst of the bargain. A "no strike" policy --the analogy, in labor disputes, to nonviolence --rarely works for any length of time. And even when it seems to work for some years and disputes are settled without strikes, a strike situation or a serious strike threat may eventually arise. The threat of a strike or a lockout is ever present as a last-resort pressure for compromise.<sup>34</sup>

It is immediately apparent that "eruption" is not a component of most strike situations. Neither side can harm the other more than a day at a time, i.e., denial of production or denial of pay. Seldom anymore does either side take the ultimate step, or "erupt" by burning down the plant or by shooting the workers, since either action is ruinous to both sides.

Escalation beyond the "agreed battle" is incomparably more dangerous because on the international level both sides have

independent options for hurting the other side. Sudden anger, an unfortunate miscalculation or accident, or a bad decision can cause a disastrous eruption, which brings us to the "chicken" analogy. Again Kahn says,

"Chicken" is played by two drivers on a road with a white line down the middle. Both cars straddle the white line and drive toward each other at top speed. The first driver to lose his nerve and swerve into his own lane is "chicken"--an object of contempt and scorn--and he loses the game. The game is played among teenagers for prestige, for girls, for leadership of a gang, and for safety (i.e., to prevent other challenges and confrontations.)

Escalation is much more complicated than this game. Still, the game provides a useful analogy because it illustrates some aspects of international relations that are important and should be emphasized--for example, the symmetrical character of many escalation situations. Some teenagers utilize interesting tactics in playing "chicken." The "skillful" player may get into the car quite drunk, throwing whisky bottles out the window to make it clear to everybody just how drunk he is. He wears very dark glasses so that it is obvious that he cannot see much, if anything. As soon as the car reaches high speed, he takes the steering wheel and throws it out the window. If his opponent is watching, he has won. If his opponent is not watching, he has a problem; likewise if both players try this strategy.

It is clear from the above why many people would like to conduct international relations the way a teenager plays "chicken." They believe that if our decisionmakers can only give the appearance of being drunk, blind, and without a steering wheel, they will "win" in negotiations with the Soviets on crucial issues. I do not consider this a useful or responsible policy. We may be willing to run some risks, and we may not want to hem ourselves in tactically by seeming completely sober, clear-visioned, and in full control of

ourselves, but we will obviously benefit by having a reasonable degree of sobriety, a reasonable degree of clear vision, and a reasonable degree of self-control. The Soviets are likely to pursue a similar policy.

But escalation often has a crucial point of similarity to the game of "chicken": one side must convey the impression to the other side that the opponent must be the one to give way, or at least accept a reasonable compromise, yet both sides are trying to get this message across.<sup>35</sup>


The reader is reminded that while the above two analogies shed light on how competing nations often behave, these analogies like most others must not be carried to a too logical, and possibly absurd, conclusion.

#### THE ESCALATION LADDER

Herman Kahn's escalation ladder is a "methodological device that provides a convenient list of the many options facing the strategist in a two-sided confrontation and that facilitates the examination of the retardation and the growth of crises--the ladder indicates that there are many continuous paths between a low-level crisis and an all-out war, none of which are necessarily or inexorably to be followed."<sup>36</sup>

Figure 2 is a scale of roughly ascending crisis intensity levels which provides not a model of a particular discrete crisis situation but rather a "shopping list" from which an infinite number of escalation scenarios can be constructed. The order of the rungs is by no means fixed, neither must one go up the ladder. With a little reflection one realizes that crisis situations can also be deescalated (go down the ladder), "erupted" (go from the

**FIGURE 2**  
**AN ESCALATION LADDER**  
**A Generalized (or Abstract) Scenario**



bottom to anywhere near the top) without warning, or stabilized at a single rung indefinitely. This particular ladder has 44 rungs, built upon a foundation (preescalation) stage called "Disagreement --Cold War" and crowned with a postescalation stage called "Aftermaths." These rungs are grouped into seven categories separated by six "thresholds" at which sharp changes in the character of the escalation take place. These are recognizable stopping places. No one invented them. They are just there.

#### THE SEVEN CATEGORIES AND THEIR THRESHOLDS

Many serious students of current events, with no political or ideological ax to grind, will argue that the Cold War is far from fading. These are not likely to take comfort from the fact that the Soviet threat has become increasingly ambiguous since the failure of the communist adventure in South Korea, 1950-1953. Others, perhaps, need to be reminded that the Cold War is alive and well by such events as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in of 1968 and the chilling enunciation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which followed.

It can be agreed, however, that a certain restraint has overtaken US-Soviet relations of late because of a mutual realization that filling arsenals with more weapons of mass destruction buys security for no one. But, even assuming progress in urgently needed Arms Limitations, the fundamental objectives of the super-powers remain substantially unchanged and incompatible. It does not seem

particularly unrealistic to assume that conflicts of interest somewhere in the world could prompt one of the super-powers to set foot on the first, or even a higher rung. Here are some possible options:

Sub-crisis Maneuvering (Rungs 1 through 3). For these three rungs the principal weapon is rhetoric. These might be classed as preventive escalation designed to forestall more overt escalation on the part of the adversary. No action in this group would be considered to be "rocking the boat"; hence, their credibility is low. The pressure is strong on both sides to remain at this level. When positions harden, however, and the antagonists attempt to increase their credibility with more than just rhetoric, the "boat is rocked."

Traditional Crises (Rungs 4 through 9). Some of these measures include a significant mobilization (such as Berlin '61) and a dramatic military confrontation (Naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis '62). Although the threat casts a long shadow, no one at this point seriously believes that nuclear weapons will be used. But as the crisis deepens and tension mounts, a significant number of people begin to believe that to match the deployment, say, of the other side's superior conventional power at the trouble spot, nuclear weapons may have to be used. The "Nuclear war is unthinkable" threshold has been crossed, and events have now reached the next category.

Intense Crises (Rungs 10 through 20). This is a fuzzy threshold that results in a state of "neither war nor peace," but the old

confidence is gone and the public is glued to their television sets. Diplomatic relations are broken; strategic forces are placed in a "super ready" status (as happened during the Suez crisis of 1956); a large scale conventional war (probably undeclared) might break out (more likely on the border between the Soviet Union and China); a small nuclear weapon is "unintentionally" fired (by "accident," or by an "unauthorized" person); or a "justifiable" counterforce attack is launched against a "spying" radar or airfield from which a U-2 type aircraft has taken off. At some point in this rapidly heating war of nerves the nuclear threshold is crossed.

The Nuclear Threshold. This threshold is singled out for more extensive treatment because of its traditional importance to all concerned. For more than 25 years this has been a threshold that everyone has known and understood. It has become sacrosanct by the very fidelity of its observance since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Volumes have been written about its importance. The following are some of the traditional arguments for preserving or breaching this historic threshold:

#### PRESERVING THE THRESHOLD

1. There is no more obvious "firebreak" than this one. No interpretation or judgment need be exercised, just as none was needed concerning the use of poison gas during World War II.
2. No other threshold has been so "ratified by emotion" and accepted by the majority of people everywhere.

3. While the lower thresholds are automatically reestablished for other crises, it is unlikely that, once broken, the nuclear threshold after 25 years of inviolability would ever be the same again.

4. Once the onus was "on" someone for first use, the restraints on everyone else would be dangerously weakened, especially the lesser nuclear powers, if they felt seriously threatened by a non-nuclear power.

5. The pressures for escalation or even eruption are immeasurably higher once this "Rubicon" is crossed.

6. The strong "no nuclear use" tradition has been an inhibiting factor on the proliferation of these weapons. If this threshold were breached, it is likely that lesser powers such as India, Japan, Israel, Egypt and West Germany, would seek to acquire them.

7. Possession by many smaller powers without the old restraints against using them, would greatly increase world instability. Nuclear blackmail, with all of the danger of miscalculation, might become commonplace.

8. With the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still fresh, the first postwar use by the US of nuclear weapons on a smaller, non-white nation would provoke a worldwide revulsion against the US which conceivably could produce an enduring, possibly fatal isolation.

In summary, in a world where no legislature rules all, it is in the interest of all to hold to whatever milestones, such as the nuclear threshold, that contribute to stability and to the safety of all.

### BREACHING THE THRESHOLD

The following arguments have been advanced for breaching the nuclear threshold:

1. Modern technology has produced nuclear weapons hardly larger than the largest iron bombs of World War II. Not to use these weapons when their use would serve the national interest, particularly when the nation was being blackmailed by a non-nuclear power, is naive and unrealistic.
2. A threshold weakened to the distribution and use of nuclear weapons might make deterrence work so well as to eliminate all forms of violence from international relations. Thus, argues Pierre Gallois, "Contrary to popular belief, the further we advance in the ballistic-nuclear age, the more possible it becomes to outlaw violence, even if the aggressor nation is stronger and more richly supplied with combat means than the nation it threatens."<sup>38</sup>
3. Strict observance of a "no-first use" position on the part of the US only tempts the Soviets to adventurism in Central Europe with their conventional superiority.
4. Related to point # 3, since infantry, armor, and even aircraft have to be employed en masse in the offense to be effective, nuclear weapons now give the tactical edge to the defense. Thus, defensive powers such as NATO are chronically at a disadvantage when they observe the nuclear threshold. Any perceived unwillingness by the US to use nuclear weapons strains the alliance especially as the US pressures the NATO Allies to increase their conventional forces.

5. If more countries possessed nuclear weapons and the will to use them, there would be a greater incentive to negotiate their differences, thus avoiding such open confrontations as the recent Sino-Indian border war.

6. The development of new and more efficient weapons systems without a practical commitment to use them may ultimately erode the will of those who must order their use. Such failure of will could preclude resolute defense, narrowing the choices to accommodation or surrender.

Other arguments for and against crossing the nuclear threshold can be advanced. One thing seems clear, however: crossing this threshold is irreversible. Once crossed, the way is clear for the uncharted and even more speculative rungs.

Bizarre Crises (Rungs 21 through 25). Even though by this time "nuclear incredulity"<sup>39</sup> has been shattered, nuclear weapons would not have been used extensively. Kahn calls these crises "bizarre"<sup>40</sup> because no precedent exists for them, some going so far to say that even discussing them is immoral, or at best academic. Kahn replies that because "these issues are hypothetical and analytical does not mean that they should not be taken seriously . . . . The option discussed here could be both an alternative to central war itself and one of the most credible routes to such war. . . . Some decision-makers are likely, in a desperate crisis, to prefer them to the alternative of central war."<sup>41</sup> These five rungs incorporate the announced, deliberate use of nuclear weapons, first against selected, limited military targets on the opponent's periphery, then against

any tactical targets on the periphery. The final rung in this group is the extensive evacuation of one's own population centers indicating that consideration is being given to striking the opponent's central sanctuary. If this threshold (central sanctuary) is crossed, the way is open to large scale violence against the enemy homeland.

Exemplary Central Attacks (Rungs 26 through 31). The least violent attack in this group might be an attack on a sparsely populated portion of the homeland area such as central Siberia or the Mojave Desert. Next is an attack on a selected ("exemplary") military target not too close in. The next most serious threat is an attack on a selected military target nearer a large city but without collateral (civilian) damage. This is followed by an exemplary attack on an enemy city. The last rung of this group is a tit-for-tat very slow, deliberate "city exchange." At this point the central war threshold is about to be crossed, when all-out war is no longer "unthinkable." Still exercising restraint of sorts the next group of rungs concentrates on counterforce.

Military Central Wars (Rungs 32 through 38). Beginning with a possible declaration of "general" war, the targeting is entirely counterproperty or counterforce initially seeking to avoid killing civilians. The highest rung no longer makes that distinction, indicating that the last threshold (city targeting) is about to be crossed. Nothing is left to the adversaries but the last steps before the ultimate escalation.

Civilian Central War (Rungs 39 through 44), i.e., deliberate attacks on purely civilian targets. Kahn points out that (except where quality military targets are emplaced within a population center) attacks on civilians make little sense in a thermonuclear war because the duration of such a war would be too short for much production of goods or training of military manpower. Besides, civilians would already have been evacuated if any appreciable escalation had already occurred. The effort during this final stage is to bring the adversary to terms while he still has weapons in his arsenal. This failing, the final insane act according to Kahn is to launch all remaining weapons in an insensate spasm of suicidal fury, so that nothing remains but "The Aftermath."

#### CASE STUDIES OF ESCALATION STRATEGY

In an age when unlimited war means global holocaust, nations have been content to place limits on their violence. Within those limits nations continue to probe one another's intentions and capabilities, moving constantly up and down the lower rungs of escalation. In the so-called Cold War, this is generally a political game, using military means as opposed to a purely warfighting exercise.<sup>42</sup> Graduated escalation is the "exemplary" use of force in carefully controlled amounts for the purpose of changing an adversary's behavior. In certain aspects it compares favorably with the labor strike analogy mentioned earlier. "Graduated" connotes a certain slowness because the adversary is deliberately given time to assess the coercive measures being applied to him. This has also been called

the "try and see" approach.<sup>43</sup> There is a generally larger first application of force to get the adversary's attention. The threat of greater imminent punishment is omitted in order to permit the adversary to devote his full attention to the situation at hand. Some complain that this strategy of escalation may be viewed as weakness by an adversary. Others condemn it because it commits, or appears to commit, power in a piecemeal fashion. Indeed, these are dangers to be avoided.

The other general form of escalation, more analogous to the game of "Chicken," can be called anticipatory escalation. This strategy is less violent initially and draws the adversary's attention to the dangerous and perhaps uncontrollable consequences of an anticipated escalation if he does not come to terms. A rapid movement up the ladder is strongly implied if not stated. A. L. George calls this the "tacit-ultimatum" approach,<sup>44</sup> which is an excellent descriptive for the act itself, but is less than satisfactory as a name for the process.

Figure 3 summarizes these two approaches to escalation and compares the advantages and disadvantages of each. This comparison is useful in considering the four historical examples which follow of the use of escalation strategy.<sup>45</sup>

#### GRADUATED ESCALATION IN KOREA--1950

On 25 June 1950 the North Korean People's Army struck without warning across the 38th parallel driving the ROK Army before it. Communist strategy was to present the Western Powers, particularly

FIGURE 3  
COMPARISON OF TYPES OF ESCALATION

|                 |  | GRADUATED  | ANTICIPATORY   |
|-----------------|--|--|--|
| CHARACTERISTICS | 1. OBJECTIVE OF THE ESCALATION           | TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE IMMEDIATE PAIN OF NON-COOPERATION  | TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE DANGEROUS FUTURE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COOPERATION   |
|                 | 2. DEGREE OF FORCE APPLIED INITIALLY     | STRONG   | LOW TO MODERATE  |
|                 | 3. SUBSEQUENT USE OF FORCE, IF NEEDED    | VARIED. MAY BE SAME OR LESSER DEGREE OF FORCE ON MORE SENSITIVE TARGET   | VERY STRONG, EVEN CATASTROPHIC   |
|                 | 4. REACTION TIME PERMITTED BETWEEN RUNGS | MODERATE TO EXTENSIVE  | SHORT  |
|                 | 5. ADVANTAGES                            | a. Less dangerous if the adversary is a major power.<br>b. Least likely to get out of hand.<br>c. Permits maximum time for a <u>reasonable</u> enemy to weigh his response.<br>d. Permits time for user to gain public support, if initially lacking.<br>e. Credibility not a factor because of strong initial use of force. | a. Requires less (possibly no) initial expenditure of resources.<br>b. May settle issue quickly. Particularly important if enemy threat is dangerous and imminent.   |
|                 | 6. DISADVANTAGES                         | a. May be equated with weakness by the enemy, and by conservative elements at home.<br>b. Tends to commit power piecemeal.<br>c. Gives enemy time to initiate counter-measures.<br>d. Favors totalitarian side, since "democracies cannot fight long wars."  | a. With low initial use of force, strong credibility is required to threaten catastrophic consequences successfully.<br>b. Needs strong public support, or, if lacking, a <u>high</u> assurance that the issue will be settled quickly; otherwise, it should not be attempted.<br>c. More dangerous if the adversary is a major power. |
| ADV AND DISADV  |  |  |  |

the US, with a fait accompli before any effective countermeasures could be applied. They had counted heavily on Korea's being outside the US defensive perimeter in the Far East.<sup>46</sup> President Syngman Rhee immediately requested American aid from President Truman, forcing the latter to one of the most momentous decisions of the Cold War. Because the aggression was so blatant, so obvious to a world become accustomed to the Truman Doctrine, the President had little option but to respond. His response was an early manifestation of graduated escalation. A chronology of the major events of the first two weeks is as follows:

25 June--US requests UN Security Council to call upon North Korea to cease their attack and withdraw to the 38th parallel. General MacArthur is authorized to secure Kimpo Airfield by force to enable evacuation of American dependents and non-combatants. American air and naval units are ordered forward from the Philippines.

26 June--North Koreans disregard the UN, claiming that they were attacked first. General MacArthur is authorized to use his naval and air forces to attack all North Korean military targets south of the 38th parallel. Seventh Fleet ordered to protect Taiwan.

27 June--US requests UN Security Council to condemn the North Korean aggression and to appeal to UN members to furnish assistance necessary to repel the attack. (Passed, seven to one with two abstentions on 27 June. Soviet representative was absent.) US Ambassador to Moscow delivers note asking Soviets to disavow

responsibility for the attack and to use its influence with the North Koreans to cease and desist. Soviets brand Security Council resolution illegal.

28 June--Seoul falls. General MacArthur authorized to extend naval and air attacks into North Korea and to use Army troops to secure a port and air base near Pusan.

30 June--General MacArthur reports situation deteriorating badly; is authorized to send a regimental combat team from Japan to the battlefield. Congressional leaders informed. None dissent.

1 July--JCS instruct General MacArthur to blockade North Korea staying clear of Manchurian and Soviet coastal waters. Soviets informed.

7 July--UN requests formation of unified command under US Commander. MacArthur appointed.<sup>47</sup> ..

From this period of less than two weeks several lessons on graduated escalation can be drawn.

The cautious, piecemeal escalation of U.S. military operations during the first week of the war, had little effect either politically or militarily on the North Korean forces that were rapidly overrunning South Korea. We did not place the aggressor under immediate, urgent pressure to call off his action or to limit its objectives. Instead, US policymakers hoped that the North Koreans would be loath to attack even token US forces once they were deployed. We did not signal anything approximating the "tacit-ultimatum" strategy. Nothing approaching an "anticipatory escalation" was signalled or threatened to the Russians or their client. Indeed, U.S. leaders

were so intimidated by the risk of Soviet involvement that a commitment to defend Korea did not crystallize for several days after the outbreak.

The subsequent events leading to a final armistice on 27 July 1953 are well known. Four are worth mentioning: MacArthur's Inchon invasion in September, the Red Chinese intervention and precipitous retreat of the UN command in November, General Ridgway's successful counteroffensive and seizure of the initiative in February and March of 1951, and General MacArthur's relief in April. After the spectacular success of the Inchon landing and rout of the North Korean Army, the US, indeed the UN, objectives were changed from expulsion of the aggressors from South Korea to outright unification of all of Korea. The disastrous reversals suffered at the hands of the Chinese in November forced the abandonment of this objective and nearly forced the abandonment of Korea itself, at least temporarily.<sup>48</sup> General Ridgway's brilliant leadership reversed the situation; nevertheless, Washington had firmly decided against unifying Korea by force. But not MacArthur! Reports Berger:

On March 24 /1951, ed.,/ MacArthur issued a statement in Tokyo in which he pointed out the general weaknesses that had been uncovered by Chinese losses in recent battles. He stated that Red China lacked the industrial capacity to conduct modern war; that her numerical superiority was overcome by existing methods of mass destruction; and that it had been shown that Red China could not by force of arms conquer Korea. "The enemy, therefore," MacArthur said, "must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations

to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse." MacArthur thereupon offered to meet with the enemy commander in the field to realize the political objectives of the U.N. in Korea.<sup>51</sup>

This unilateral action of MacArthur's led to his relief by President Truman some two and a half weeks later. From the beginning US policy was based upon the fear of an uncontrollable war with China and a belief that the USSR may have started the Korean war to entangle the US in Asia while the Soviets had a free hand in Western Europe. MacArthur felt that if the US really believed in its policy of nuclear deterrence for the defense of Europe, it could and should act accordingly in Asia.<sup>49</sup> President Truman did not agree and undoubtedly felt that he lacked the credibility to use the "tacit-ultimatum" strategy mentioned earlier. Graduated escalation met its first major cold war failure.

#### GRADUATED ESCALATION ON QUEMOY--1958

On 1 August 1958, Red Chinese Marshal Chu Teh publicly denounced US military bases "encircling" China, setting off a war of nerves in Taipei. This led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the Pescadores and Matsu Islands as a precaution against Red Chinese attack. The following is a selected chronology of significant events:

8 August--MIG-17 fighters appear in large numbers on the mainland opposite Formosa.

19 August--Nationalists declare US support necessary to defend the off-shore islands.

23 August--Red Chinese fire 50,000 rounds in two hours at Quemoy. Warning by Secretary Dulles.

24 August--Red Chinese planes strafe the islands. DOD alerts 7th Fleet to take "precautionary" measures.

26 August--US warships with Marines embarked leave Singapore (26 August).

27 August--President Eisenhower declares off-shore islands important to the defense of Formosa. One carrier each ordered from Mediterranean and Hawaii to reinforce 7th Fleet. Peiping warns Taipei to withdraw forces from the islands since air invasion is imminent. Washington warns Peiping for the third time in six days not to invade.

Remainder of August--Reds continue to shell Quemoy.

2 September--Nationalists destroy 12 communist gunboats in heavy fighting.

4 September--President Eisenhower declares willingness to use force to defend Quemoy and Matsu.

6 September--Chou En-lai calls for resumption of Formosa talks with US. Bombardment of Quemoy ceases.

7 September--US warships convoy Nationalist supply ships to Quemoy.

8 September--Reds warn US not to convoy. Khrushchev declares that an attack on the PRC is an attack on the USSR.

9 September--Secretary Dulles declares that US ships will return fire.

11 September--President Eisenhower informs US public that US will fight if necessary. Communist artillery drives Nationalist supply ship from Quemoy.

19 September--Khrushchev sends sharp warning to US. (Rejected by Washington)

22 September--US supersonic aircraft and missiles arrive on Formosa.

22 September--Communist bombardment stepped up.

29 September--State Department declares situation improving. Secretary Dulles says he favors reduction of forces on Quemoy if Reds cease fire.

6 October--Reds announce temporary ceasefire; will not fire on unconvoyed Nationalist ships. US declares it will not convoy if Reds cease fire permanently.

8 October--US announces end of convoys.

13 October--Red Chinese extend ceasefire for two weeks.

17 October--Chiang reaffirms his intention to keep the offshore islands. Reds spot US ship near Quemoy and resume shelling. US declares it will not resume convoys until "necessary."

23 October--Secretary Dulles and Chiang announce that Nationalists will not attempt to retake mainland by force; hint reduction of Quemoy garrison once shelling ceases.

25 October--Reds announce ceasefire on even-numbered days of the month. Unescorted supply ships may proceed.

In the months that followed moderate shelling (generally every other day) and polemics (frequent) continued, but the crisis was over. A. L. George summed it up this way:

In the Quemoy crisis, the United States was confronted with a different type of provocation: a limited military probe rather than an attempt at a fait accompli. The Chinese artillery fire was shrewdly designed to clarify U. S. intentions in the first instance rather than to test Chinese Nationalist and U. S. capabilities for defending the offshore islands. U. S. leaders were not confronted with the immediate necessity to provide a high confidence defense of Quemoy. The major task, rather, was to signal U. S. intentions clearly and convincingly, and early enough in the crisis to forestall a Chinese Communist miscalculation that might lead to an expansion of the conflict. This, in fact, the Administration did do.

. . . what began as a Chinese Communist probe of U. S. intentions developed into a low-scale test of Chinese Nationalist and U. S. capabilities to resupply the island. The aggressor had been allowed to establish a relatively favorable set of ground rules for a "test of capabilities," a test that he thought he might win, since it was not yet clear whether the United States would escalate additionally later on, if need be, to ensure resupply of Quemoy. Moreover, such a "test of capabilities" over the question of resupply of Quemoy gave the Communists an attractive opportunity to exacerbate political difficulties between the Chinese Nationalists and their U.S. ally and to mobilize world political pressures on behalf of their cause in the dispute. This the Chinese Communists proceeded to do for several weeks--and they came close to succeeding--before finally curtailing <sup>50</sup> and then calling off the artillery shelling.

Close or not, the firm, graduated escalation strategy of the United States accomplished its purpose. It is possible that President Eisenhower's great military experience enhanced his credibility with the Chinese communists. The actions authorized

by the President were likely, moreover, to have been perceived by them as purely defensive in nature, with minimal threat to the physical security of the mainland. Contrast this with the apparent threat to Chinese territory of MacArthur's drive to the Yalu in 1950. The UN forces in Korea were by then operating in captured territory where UN motivation to take must surely have been less than the communist motivation to hold. The situation, and hence, the motivational factors were reversed on Quemoy. Perceived threat, differing levels of motivation, and clear limitation of objectives were the principal factors contrasting the Korea and Quemoy examples. The escalation strategy worked in Quemoy largely because these three factors operated in the Nationalists' favor.

#### ANTICIPATORY ESCALATION IN CUBA--1962<sup>51</sup>

In the four years since Castro's takeover, Cuba leaned more and more to the Soviets and tension mounted in the Caribbean. US reaction was strong against Cuban attempts to export revolution to Latin America, increasing Castro's fear of US intervention. The Soviets vowed their support. Vast shipments of Soviet arms and other materiel arrived in Cuba under the watchful eye of US intelligence. Khrushchev repeatedly assured President Kennedy that all such military equipment was strictly defensive and that under no circumstances would offensive weapons, and missiles in particular, be introduced into Cuba. Then on 16 October 1962, a U-2 aircraft brought back photographs indicating that offensive, nuclear missile sites were being built in Cuba. President Kennedy called together

the "ExCom" (Executive Committee: Ad Hoc Group from the National Security Council) in emergency session. While awaiting further information to be gathered, three basic courses of action were considered: A Naval "quarantine;" massive air strikes to destroy the missile sites; and an invasion of Cuba. The JCS favored air strikes, and if necessary, an invasion on the grounds that a quarantine would not stop the work on the sites, which would be ready very shortly. Moreover, the quarantine was the weakest response and might lead the Soviets to underestimate US resolve. Secretary McNamara and Robert Kennedy favored the quarantine, first on grounds that the US could not attack a weak nation by surprise without losing its moral standing in the world, and that, by beginning small the US could always escalate later. In addition, the Tactical Air Commander could not guarantee that all the sites would be destroyed before a missile could be fired. The major subsequent events are as follows:

Period 16-21 October--Analysis of courses of action, preparation of speech to US public for 22 October, formulation of legal briefs, plan for OAS meeting, UN resolutions, plan to notify allies, message to Khrushchev, and plans for 250,000 man invasion force.

22 October--President Kennedy announces in an address to the US public: preparation of Soviet offensive missile bases in Cuba; US objective is "to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western hemisphere;" naval quarantine in effect against arms shipments to Cuba, not to be lifted until offensive weapons are dismantled and removed; launching of a nuclear missile from Cuba

against any nation in the Western hemisphere would be considered to be an attack on the US, "requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." Copy of speech sent to Khrushchev with a letter from President Kennedy urging the former not to misjudge US determination.

23 October--Letter from Khrushchev challenges US right to quarantine, tells of Soviet alert, accuses US of taking a step toward nuclear war. US demands in the UN that bases be dismantled. Soviets in the UN call for condemnation of US. OAS unanimously backs US. Invasion force assembles in Florida. 180 US Naval vessels deployed to Caribbean.

24 October--US Navy is ordered to sink any of the 24 Soviet ships heading for Cuba that fail to heed the quarantine. US military buildup reaches peak. Dependents evacuated from Guantanamo.

25 October--Soviet oil tanker stopped without boarding and allowed to proceed. President Kennedy replies to Khrushchev's letter reminding him of the falsehood of Russian disclaimers about the missiles, urging him to withdraw them.

26 October--White House announces Soviet missile buildup continuing. Panamanian owned, Soviet chartered, freighter is the first ship to be inspected. Proceeds without incident. Reconnaissance flights over Cuba increased. Khrushchev replies to President Kennedy in a personal, very emotional letter offering to withdraw missiles if US lifts quarantine and does not invade Cuba.

27 October--Khrushchev sends a second, official letter offering to withdraw missiles from Cuba if US withdraws missiles from Turkey.

U2 pilot shot down and killed over Cuba. JCS recommend air strike on 29 October, followed by an invasion. President Kennedy replies to Khrushchev rejecting the second offer, while accepting the first, and threatening "intensification" if the missiles remain. Robert Kennedy meets with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, informs him of the President's letter to Khrushchev, telling the Ambassador that the US must have a reply by 28 October, that missiles will be removed or "we will remove them."<sup>52</sup> President calls up 24 Reserve troop carrier squadrons.

28 October--Khrushchev agrees to withdraw missiles under UN supervision if President lifts quarantine and pledges not to invade Cuba.

2 November--President Kennedy reports to the nation that Soviet missile bases are being dismantled and progress is being made toward peace in the Caribbean.

In this crisis the US used the more coercive form of escalation, "anticipatory" escalation. The quarantine was chosen as the initial step which by itself would have been a weak and ineffective response (as the JCS counselled) to what was obviously a major threat. Behind the initial step, however, was the real and immediate threat to the Soviets of a most powerful, and hence credible, invasion force being assembled in Florida, a force which the Soviets were powerless to interdict. From Cuba's point of view, an invasion was the ultimate threat because it would have meant the end of Castro and communism on the island. The contrast between a weak

blockade and the quick and catastrophic end of a regime is a classic basis for an anticipatory escalation.<sup>53</sup> Its major virtue, of course, is that it worked.

From the Cuba example, four fundamental conditions can be suggested which favor anticipatory escalation by the US:

1. Stronger motivation and sense of urgency on the US side than on the enemy side. The US must want to defend something more than an aggressor wants to acquire it. This is especially important in any democratic society. It is also useful, and sometimes essential, for democracies to have the political support of their allies.

2. Clarity of objectives. Objectives drive the character of the demands and acceptable outcomes. They must be realistically limited to minimize the risk of thermonuclear war. Moreover, they must be chosen quickly to prevent being locked out by a fait accompli.

3. Usable options for escalation. These are chosen from "gross capabilities" and must be subject to political feasibility.

4. Arousal of opponent's fear of escalation. Proper choice of options is needed to preclude counter escalation by the opponent.

The final case study makes use of the above criteria to show how the United States was precluded from using an anticipatory escalation strategy in Southeast Asia.

#### GRADUATED ESCALATION IN VIETNAM--1961 to 1969

In the years following Pyongyang's failure to conquer South Korea, communist aggression has often turned the forces of nationalism

and anti-colonialism to their advantage around the world. In fomenting insurrection and chaos as a prelude to the communist seizure of power, they cloak their aims in the more legitimate sounding garb of "People's Wars" or Wars of National Liberation."

Vietnam is a classic case of the legitimate aspirations of a colonial people being harnessed to the designs of the communist movement. After the Geneva Convention of 1954, the North Vietnamese watched events in the south, expecting that neither Bao Dai nor Ngo Dinh Diem could do much with the unfavorable conditions that the French had left. Perhaps because they had anticipated taking control of the entire country after the elections of 1956, as provided for in the Geneva settlement, they left the south pretty much to itself. When President Diem, however, surprised everyone by consolidating his power and refusing to cooperate with the North Vietnamese in holding elections (to which the south had never agreed), the North Vietnamese decided to take control of the south by force. The subsequent events are well documented elsewhere. Some selected events are presented, however, to illustrate the graduated escalation which followed.

December 1960--Formation of the "National Liberation Front" (NLF) in SVN. Terrorism increases. US forces in SVN approximately 900.

December 1961--President Kennedy declares US prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to "preserve its independence." US forces in SVN approximately 3,200.

June 1962--International Control Commission reports evidence that North Vietnam (NVN) is organizing and carrying out hostile acts in SVN.

December 1962--US Forces in SVN: 11,300.

November 1963--President Diem, and later the same month President Kennedy, assassinated.

December 1963--US Forces in SVN: 16,300.

August 1964--USS Maddox and Turner Joy attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. President orders retaliatory attacks. Congress passes "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution" to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the US and to prevent further aggression."

December 1964--US Forces in SVN: 23,300.

Late 1964 to Early 1965--Evidence mounts that North Vietnamese regulars are moving into SVN.

February 1965--US begins continuous air attacks over the north to force the North Vietnamese to the conference table. Hanoi announces no negotiations until bombing stops.

13-19 May 1965--US halts the air raids. No response from Hanoi.

8 June 1965--US commanders authorized to commit US ground troops to combat.

December 1965--US Forces in SVN: 184,300.

December 1966--US Forces in SVN: 385,300.

May 1967--U Thant proposes stand-still cease fire. Accepted by US and RVN with reservations. Rejected by Hanoi.

September 1967--President Johnson offers cessation of bombing if NVN agrees to negotiate. Rejected.

December 1967--US Forces in SVN: 485,600.

January-February 1968--TET offensive.

March 1968--US halts bombing unilaterally over 90% of NVN "as a step toward peace." President Johnson withdraws from 1968 Presidential race.

May 1968--Preliminary peace talks begin in Paris between US and NVN.

October 1968--President Johnson orders halt to all bombardment of NVN. Peace talks to be broadened in Paris.

December 1968--US Forces in SVN: 536,100.

January 1969--Expanded peace talks open in Paris among US, SVN, NVN, and NLF. PRESIDENT NIXON INAUGURATED.

22 February 1969--US Forces in SVN reach peak: 543,000.

May 1969--NLF offers 10 point plan to end war, including unconditional withdrawal of US Forces. President Nixon makes counter offer of mutual withdrawal over 12 month period.

June 1969--Deescalation (with a few caveats) begins. President Nixon announces unilateral withdrawal of 25,000 troops before end-August.<sup>54</sup>

The type of coercive escalation used unsuccessfully against the North Vietnamese falls somewhere in between the middle of the "graduated" spectrum and the beginning of the "anticipatory" spectrum. That President Johnson did not adopt the anticipatory escalation strategy cannot be attributed to any inability to grasp the fundamental

differences discussed earlier. On the contrary, when the systematic bombing of the north began in February 1965, the President seems to have given the impression that the bombing would be extended even further as part of a "tacit-ultimatum" strategy. Whether the North Vietnamese ever got the signal is not clear; but if they did, it apparently was not sufficiently credible to force curtailment of their assistance to the NLF, or at that time to force them to the conference table. In effect the US bluff (if indeed it was a bluff) was called and the US never went on to more lucrative targets such as the Red River dikes or the port facilities at Haiphong. Reference to the four fundamental conditions for the effective use of an anticipatory escalation strategy (page 62) reveals that the US was shaky in at least three of the four conditions:

1. The motivation of the North Vietnamese to defeat the "neo-colonial" Americans was much higher than that of the Americans to "win" a war 9,000 miles away which did not directly threaten US security.
2. The objectives in the minds of many on both sides were clouded. Did the US want a strong anti-communist bulwark in Southeast Asia, or would any regime do so long as the people elected it?
3. The usable options were limited by the specter of intervention by the Chinese and of course US natural reluctance to cross the nuclear threshold. US Public and world opinion also played a part as the war dragged on. Measures that might have been feasible in the beginning were later ruled out by war weariness.

4. With the shadow of a large sympathetic neighbor precluding "ultimate" threats (such as outright invasion as in Cuba 1962), it was relatively easy to resist fear of escalation. In fact, except for bombing the US, the North Vietnamese showed great facility for escalating on their own, as the chronology indicates.

Thus, the US was precluded from the more coercive anticipatory strategy and was forced into a gradualism that failed. It failed because the North Vietnamese, with military and political support from both the Soviet Union and Communist China (and the physical proximity of the latter), was able to raise the level of violence along with the US, and in effect to nullify it. The challenge to the American President, both then and now, has been to apply enough pressure at one point without overdoing it at another. He must attempt to persuade the Soviets to urge moderation on the others, while punishing the North Vietnamese into abandoning their aggression, but not so severely that they are driven into the hands of Communist China. The achievement of such a balance demands not only political skill of a high order, but most likely in this particular case, a friendly smile from Dame Fortune. Above all, it seems that "graduated escalation" is far less a "war-fighting" strategy than it is a political strategy in which military power is but one of the weapons in the arsenal.

A great deal has been written about the theory of escalation, much of is summarized in the preceding pages. What has not been extensively analyzed, however, is the process of de-escalation and

war termination. The serious student will find here a rich and unexplored field with great latitude for making and testing hypotheses. A good starting point for a "Theory of De-escalation" would be an analysis of Chester Cooper's book, The Lost Crusade, from which an excellent case study can be put together.

#### WAR TERMINATION

Two of the more perceptive works dealing with war termination are Thomas Schelling's book, Arms and Influence,<sup>55</sup> cited earlier, and Paul Kecskemeti's book, Strategic Surrender.<sup>56</sup> The following paragraphs summarize some of the more obvious implications of war termination.<sup>57</sup>

The two factors immediately apparent are the war objectives and termination philosophy on both sides of the conflict. These are dynamic in the sense that what one ends up with can be totally different from one's initial objectives because of the changing fortunes of war. Each side seeks to maximize what advantages remain in order to preserve its society or to enhance its postwar power position. In the case of general nuclear war, many theorists assume that after a massive thermonuclear exchange the dazed survivors will simply wander off to pick up the pieces of their lives somewhere else. But, as Herman Kahn has pointed out, plausible scenarios can be constructed, short of "insensate, spasm war," in which it might be very much in the interest of the warring parties to terminate hostilities while weapons and cities still remain. For example one or both parties may have achieved their minimum objectives, or

discovered that their original objectives were not worth fighting for after all, or finally (in the case of the loser) that further fighting is impossible. The major elements of the last two ("exhaustion") situations are:

1. Loss of combat power (either the means or the will to use it or both).
2. "Unacceptable" population losses. This is a highly subjective factor. Perhaps the more primitive or regimented a society, the greater the losses it can sustain. Certainly, the suddenness of the losses can act as a shock multiplier and lead to an earlier collapse of public support.
3. Irreplaceable loss of essential resources through strategic bombing, loss of territory, or interdiction of assistance from allies.
4. Weakened public morale through any combination of the above or through the ultimate failure to reconcile the moral or tangible objectives of the war with the sacrifices necessary to wage it. This element is the most important by far since many nations have fought on, often successfully, when all the other factors were against them.

Assuming that one of the two major combatants has reached the point where almost anything is preferable to the continuation of hostilities, what are the basic termination options open to it?

1. Unconditional surrender. Although this is the worst case, it is also the least likely. If the war has been a high intensity nuclear war, both sides have most probably sustained so much damage

that neither can impose such conditions on the other. Since lesser conflicts are characterized by more limited objectives, so must the termination conditions be similarly limited. Only Nazi Germany in 1945 approximated the conditions in modern times under which unconditional surrender was completely logical.

2. Conditional defeat leading to negotiations for the best terms. This is a viable option when one antagonist knows that victory is slipping away while he still possesses considerable bargaining power. Such power may not be sufficient to forestall national humiliation, yet may be adequate to prevent actual occupation of his homeland. This option approximates the one chosen by Germany in 1918.

3. Inconclusive outcome. When neither side has the political or military resources to press the fight, this option may be the only alternative to indefinite attrition. It obviates the humiliation of either side, may provide for tacit recognition of gains already won or return to the status quo ante, or permit one or both simply to fade away, possibly to fight another day.

The latter of the three options seems increasingly more likely in this age of revolutionary displacement where nothing appears to be clear-cut and conclusive anymore.

## SECTION V

### THE USE OF MILITARY POWER TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

"Power is an elusive concept. It is an ability to pursue and achieve goals effectively, and to persuade or coerce others to accede to given actions and objectives . . . . In international politics, power involves the application of the state's strength and capacity to the advancement of national interests and the attainment of goals."<sup>58</sup>

To answer the question of how to use power to achieve national goals is the supreme task of the strategist.<sup>59</sup> The US National Strategy is based upon the Nixon Doctrine whose key elements are:

1. The honoring of all treaty commitments.
2. The shielding from threats by a nuclear power of allies and others whose survival is vital to US security.
3. In cases of lesser aggression, the furnishing of appropriate military and economic assistance to threatened nations when requested. Threatened nations, however, are responsible to provide the manpower necessary to defend themselves.<sup>60</sup>

From these elements Secretary Laird issued the following national security planning objectives for the 1970's:

- Preservation by the US of an adequate strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.
- Development and/or continued maintenance of Free World forces that are effective, and minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces should deterrence fail.

--International Security Assistance Programs to enhance Free World self-defense and regional cooperation and security agreements.<sup>61</sup>

To meet the criteria set forth above, the first priority must be the maintenance of survivable, fully credible, strategic nuclear forces capable of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage upon the USSR. Survivability requires some optimum combination of the following:

Concealment, hardening, dispersal, mobility, early warning, quick launch posture and ballistic missile defense of fixed ICBM sites. All of these desirable characteristics are achieved by having a balanced force mix of land based ICBM's with ABM protection, a modern bomber penetration force, and sea based launching platforms, all tied together with highly responsive, survivable command and control and early warning radar systems. The credibility of the combined force is a combination of the adequate technology and numbers of the weapons and their delivery systems, the professionalism of the crews who man them, and the will of the political leadership to order their use, if needed. The factors listed for survivability and credibility, taken together, insure that unacceptable damage can be inflicted upon any potential aggressor.

The second priority is for dual capable, general purpose forces with fully responsive sea and airlift strong enough to:

1. Reinforce forward deployed forces, especially in Central Europe.

2. Engage and defeat the general purpose forces of either the USSR or the PRC anywhere in the world should they attack an ally or nation whose security is vital to that of the US.

3. Respond to any other request for military assistance in the remainder of the conflict spectrum as directed by the President. This latter subpriority includes everything from training foreign nationals in the US to overt participation in every form of sub-limited war.

The third priority, is to provide the military component of the Security Assistance Program such as MAAG's, Mission, Training teams, and the like.

In the light of constrained budget and manpower ceilings expected for the 1970's, it is essential that:

1. Potential enemies not be permitted to interpret any fiscal austerity on the nation's part as a sign of weakness or lessened commitment to Free World security, or

2. If they do, the US act with resolution, not hesitation, in meeting any challenges forthcoming.

3. The US not slacken in its support of NATO lest these nations, especially West Germany, seek more than "understanding" with the USSR.

4. The US maintain close relations with Japan and encourage the latter to commit a greater share of its wealth to its own defense.

5. The military services press for continued modernization of all forces to get more combat power from less manpower.

6. Expanded Reserve Components take up as much of the slack as possible by reaching a new level of professionalism and combat readiness.

7. Progress be made in SALT negotiations so that the equivalent security on both sides can be bought with smaller expenditures of resources.

8. The US be careful not to overextend its power and expend its limited resources on unworthy objectives. The expected gains must be commensurate with the anticipated effort.

## SECTION VI

### CONCLUSION

For as long as history has been recorded, or legends remembered, man has been at war with man. Conflict is as much a part of the nature of man as any other instinct. To seek therefore to eliminate war from men's breasts is as futile an undertaking as it is noble. While idealists seek new ways to reshape the character of man in a loftier mold, the realists among us must endeavor to restrain the evil that lurks in the hearts of even the best. When evil men, or otherwise good men with a narrow twisted notion of their national self-interest, control the destinies of powerful nations, other nations must organize their power to defend themselves.

Unfortunately, Americans have been slow to recognize genuine threats to their national interest; and when they do, their response is likely to take the form of a moralistic crusade to save the world from something. Such crusades tend to make the objectives open-ended and the means unlimited. In the nuclear age when unlimited means endanger the survival of mankind, it is more urgent than ever that US military power be a highly responsive, credible instrument of the nation's political strategy. This strategy, based upon an enlightened self-interest, must increasingly be balanced with and linked to a mutual self-interest among the entire family of free nations upon this planet.

The only alternative to an unstable world threatened by Armageddon are verifiable and enforceable agreements between the

US and USSR limiting and, if possible, reducing the dangerous levels to which their nuclear arsenals have grown. Above all, no power should be allowed any strategic advantage which tempts it to a sudden disarming attack upon another or conversely frightens another into an insane preemptive act. But strategic deterrence is only one facet of the problem. Now that the Soviets have achieved strategic parity, will nuclear retaliation be credible any longer against conventional threats, however limited or massive? Was DeGaulle right after all? Must the smaller powers build nuclear arsenals for their own protection? Must the West now seek conventional parity even as the USSR sought nuclear parity in the past?

These are questions which must be answered in the years immediately ahead. Or as Hanson Baldwin has recently observed:

Today the United States is again at an historical crossroads. We are entering an era of negotiations. The United States and Russia, the Warsaw Pact and NATO discuss arms limitations and the thinning out of forces in Europe. This can be a hopeful development in the epic of man. But it can also be a snare and delusion . . . we must use our own power to force the limitation of power . . . we must arm to parley. Or there will be no meaningful parley. Or we shall enter an era of incalculable risk. We must keep our powder dry. And if we do, there will not be a global Utopia; it will be the same old world in which US national security is--not guaranteed, for there is no absolute security, no infinite guarantee--but reasonably insured. One way lies hope; the other, decline and fall.<sup>62</sup>

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## FOOTNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (originally published in 1832). p. 402.
2. US, USSR, Red China, Japan, Western Europe.
3. Secretary Laird does derive certain "objectives" from his sufficiency criteria such as a second strike capability to deter a massive surprise attack on US strategic forces; providing no incentive for the USSR to strike first in a crisis; preventing the USSR from inflicting greater damage to US urban/industrial centers than the US can inflict on theirs; defending against unsophisticated or accidental launches. (Annual DoD Report: National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence 15 February 1972, p. 65.)
4. I Corinthians 14:8.
5. The extreme forms of "influence" are discussed in the section dealing with escalation.
6. Smith Simpson, "The Nature and Dimensions of Diplomacy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1968, p. 143.
7. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966), p. 1.
8. Schelling, p. 1.
9. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Moscow's Active Foreign Policy," US News and World Report (2 November 1970), p. 26.
10. Schelling, pp. 69-71.
11. Ibid., p. 11.
12. Michael Howard, "Military Power and International Order," International Affairs, (July 1964), p. 406.
13. Schelling, p. 7.
14. Ibid., p. 6.
15. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (1961), p. 12.
16. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1960), p. 146.
17. Ibid., p. 157.

18. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 126.
19. Snyder, p. 15.
20. Page 133.
21. The world has largely forgotten that in bringing the war to an early conclusion over a million lives were saved. It was estimated at the time that at least 100,000 Americans and 1,000,000 Japanese would have perished in a final assault on the home islands.
22. Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (1966), pp. 36, 37.
23. Ibid., p. 116.
24. Ibid., pp. 117, 118.
25. Ibid., p. 122.
26. Ibid., p. 125.
27. As quoted in SECDEF's posture statement, "National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 February 1972.
28. Herman Kahn, On Escalation (1965), p. 3 (footnote). With exceptions as otherwise footnoted herein, the rationale on the following pages is based largely on Kahn's definitive work.
29. Ibid., p. 5.
30. Several illustrative examples of escalation technique to include the Korean example will be presented in the brief case studies at the end of this section.
31. Kahn uses the term "eruption" as a sudden jump or transformation from controlled conflict into something far more deadly, such as a strategic nuclear exchange.
32. Schelling, pp. 116-125 and 136 (footnote).
33. Kahn, On Escalation, pp. 9-15.
34. Ibid., pp. 9, 10.
35. Ibid., pp. 10, 11.
36. Ibid., p. 37; italics added.
37. Ibid., p. 39.

38. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961), p. 113.
39. Raymond Aron's phrase and used extensively by Herman Kahn.
40. Webster: "Strikingly out of the ordinary."
41. Kahn, On Escalation, p. 135.
42. Alexander L. George, "Some Thoughts on Escalation," RAND Memorandum RM-4844PR (December 1965), p. 4.
43. Ibid., p. 6.
44. Ibid.
45. Except as otherwise noted, the source material for this discussion is from A. L. George, "Some Thoughts on Escalation."
46. Publicly affirmed by both Secretary of State Acheson and General MacArthur. See Allen Gutmann's Korea and the Theory of Limited War (1967), p. 1.
47. Earl Berger. The Korea Knot (2nd ed., 1964) pp. 103-112.
48. Ibid., p. 133.
49. Ibid., p. 136.
50. Current History (October through December 1958 issues).
51. A more detailed discussion may be found in Thirteen Days, a personal memoir by Robert F. Kennedy (1969).
52. Kennedy, p. 108.
53. Robert Kennedy provides the reader some excellent and sobering lessons to be learned from this episode on pages 111-128.
54. World Almanac--1972, pp. 36-37.
55. See Selected Bibliography, p. 81.
56. See Selected Bibliography, p. 81.
57. This discussion is an adaptation of a paper entitled "War Termination--A Synopsis" written by the staff of the Military Strategy Seminar, USAWC in 1967.
58. Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics (1967), p. 294.

59. Robert E. Osgood. Limited War (1957), p. 1.
60. Secretary Laird's Posture Statement, (1972), p. 22.
61. Ibid., p. 23.
62. Hanson Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 334, 335.

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